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State Party Competition Reconsidered
GERARD

s. GRYSKI

Emory University
Introduction
Political scientists have devoted a considerable amount of attention to
devising various measures or classificatory schemes of state interparty competition (ipc ).1 These endeavors served a useful heuristic purpose and assisted in
characterizing the complexion of state ipc generally, two functions significant
especially in the developmental stages of the literature on state parties .2
Too often, though , these conceptual initiatives lacked focus. Classificatory
systems can be evaluated properly only by reference to the larger purposes they
are to serve. That is, these constructs are not ends in themselves but rather are
research tools designed to assist in the investigation of more pervasive political
phenomena. 3 Such a focus materialized in the state policy literature ,4 one aspect
of which sought to assess the relative effectiveness of socioeconomic and
political factors (e.g., ipc ) in explaining interstate policy variation. This "policy
focus" now is a central consideration of research on state politics. It is possible,
therefore , to specify two criteria for the evaluation of various ipc measures: 1)
their ability to portray accurately the character of political competition in the
states , and; 2) the ease and precision - both practical and theoretical-of
their
incorporation into the current structure of research on state political systems.
We wish here to argue concerning the deficiencies of previous measures of ipc,
and, in addition, present a new measure which overcomes most of these
shortcomings .
• Special thanks to Randall Guynes and Allen DeCotiis for their comments on an earlier version of
this article.
1 See, for example: Robert Golembiewski, "A Taxonomic Approach to State Political Party
Strength ," Western Political Quarterly 11 (September , 1958); Mark Stern, "'Measuring Interparty
Competition: A Proposal and a Test of a Method," journal of Politics 34 (August, 1972); Austin
Ranney , "Pa rties in State Politics," in Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines (eds.), Politics in the
American States (Boston: Little , Brown, 1965); Richard L. Hofferbert , "C lassification of American
State Party Systems," Journal of Politics 26 (August, 1964).
2 On this point see Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall, "T he American Party Systems,"
American Political Science Review 48 (June, 1954): 477.
3 See Hofferber! , op. cit., p. 550.
'The relevant literatur e is now rather extensive. A representative sampling would include:
Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Inter-party Competition , Economic Variables, and
Welfare Policies in the American States," Journal of Politics 23 (May, 1963); Thomas R. Dye,
Politics, Economics and the Public (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966); Ira Sharkansky, "Eco nomic
and Political Correlates of State Government Expenditures: General Tendencies and Deviant
Cases," Midwest Journal of Political Science 11 (May, 1967); Charles F. Cnudde and Donald J.
McCrone, "Par ty Competition and Welfare Policies in the American States," American Political
Science Review 63 (September , 1963); Brian R. Fry and Richard F. Winters. "'The Politics of
Redistribution ," American Political Science Review 64 (June, 1970); Brian R. Fry, "Jnterparty
Comrtition and Redistribution : Theme and Variation ," journal of Political Science 3 (Spring ,
1976 .
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Deficiencies of Previous Indices
With the above two criteria in mind, two classes of problems - technical
and theoretical - become apparent in the various ipc indices extant in the
literature.
Dawson and Robinson indicated three major technical problem
areas time periods considered, offices included, and the ways of looking at competition within the context of the first two factors. 5 The time period selected for the
competition index should roughly coincide with the time period of the policy
data .6 Concentration upon one office is unreliable. 7 And if the states are to be
treated as policy "systems," then measures which include non-state races (e.g.,
U. S. Senators) are unsatisfactory ,8 regardless of how useful they may be for
indicating the general contours of state party competition. Further, while state
legislators are pivotal policy actors, consideration of these offices is often
excluded. 9 Finally , several measures resort to either placing the states into
various competitive categories 10 or rank ordering the states according to the
degree of ipc . 11 But the categories are sometimes rather crude, often not
logically distinct, and usually obscure subtle but important distinctions among
the states in any given category. Rank ordering can be misleading if the states
happen to fall in clusters, and it does not permit complex statistical operations as
would be the case if the data were presented in interval form.
A more serious technical problem concerns the manner in which legislative
competition is usually measured . Several of the measures employed in state
policy research 12 have focused on three aspects of ipc: one minus the percentage
of the popular vote of the victorious gubernatorial candidate, and one minus the
percentage of seats won by the majority party in each house of the state
legislature . Though having the advantages of data availability and ease of
measurement, this approach can distort the actual situation of party conflict in
the states . It is possible, for example, that a legislature having , say, 100 seats
could be divided equally between the two parties . Yet it is also logically possible
5

Op. cit ., p. 271.
This procedure was not followed , for example, by Dye in his influential work , op. cit . There ,
he used political data from the Fifties to study policy decisions of the Sixties. A different aspect of the
"time factor'" issue concerns the "' pendulum effect," the importance of which was argued by Joseph
A. Schlesinger in "A Two-Dimensional Scheme for Classifying States According to the degree of
Inter-Party Competition ," American Political Science Review 50 (December , 1955), and "The
Structure of Competition for Office in the United States ," Behavioral Science 5 (July, 1960). A
critique of the pendulum notion can be found in David Pfeiffer , "The Measurement of Inter-Party
Com'?:tition and Systemic Stability," American Political Science Review 61 (June , 1967): 460-61.
This was done by : V. 0 . Key, Jr ., American State Politics: An Introduction ( ew York:
Alfred A. Knopf , 1956), and Schlesinger , "A Two-Dimensional Scheme for Classifying States
According to the Degree of Inter-Party Competition ," op. cit .
8
For example Hofferbert, op. cit .
9
For example Schlesinger, "The Structure of Competition for Office in the United States, " op.
cit ., and Pfeiffer , op . cit .
10
This procedure was followed by , among others , John H. Fenton , People and Parties in
Politics (Glenview , Ilinois: Scott, Foresman and Company , 1966); Golembiewski , op. cit .; Duane
Lockard , "State Party Systems and Policy Outputs , .. in Oliver Garceau (ed .), Political Research and
Political Theory (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1968).
11
See Hofferbert, op. cit .
6
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that each of these elections was uncontested by one of the parties . Thus this
approach would classify this situation as one of "perfect" competition, clearly a
distortion of actual competitive conditions. While this admittedly is a rather
extreme example, it is usually the case that a substantial proportion of legislative
elections are decided by lopsided margins .
The theoretical problem concerns the linkage of these previous ipc constructs. It will be recalled that the impetus for this literature was the "Key
theory," which stated the ipc exerts an intervening influence between state
economic conditions and state spending for "redistributive issues." 13 Candidates in competitive districts will favor a greater level and range of public
services in an attempt to secure the votes of the large middle and lower middle
class voter blocs. The crucial linkage, then , is between the degree of competition
and public policy. Previous ipc measures, by counting legislative seats already
won by the parties, totally ignore the extent of competition in the actual
legislative elections. In effect, previous indices are measures of "legislative or
parliamentary" competition rather than "electoral" competition. These measures therefore suffer from a theoretical deficiency since the Key theory posits
an electoral rather than a parliamentary linkage between competition and
policy.

A Proposed New Measure
One method of overcomin the problems of measuring legislative competition- 1scusse a ove would be to ca culate the average vote of all candidates
of the victorious party in the elections for both houses of the legislatures. This
would in a way be similar. to the previous measures but instead would focus on
the extent of competition in each legislative district. While this approach is
preferred over previous measures, it still would not overcome a serious problem
common to both approaches . For example, according to a distribution of seats
measure of ipc both New York and Illinois are highly competitive states.14
However, most races are in fact not highly contested, with Democrats controlling Cook County and Republicans controlling downstate in Illinois, and
Democrats controlling New York City and Republicans controlling upstate in
New York. These conditions could be identified by an ipc measure which
focused on individual legislative races, but by averaging the vote of all the
candidates of the victorious party these non-competitive conditions within the
state would cancel each other out , once again producing a highly competi tive
score. In effect such indices are actually measures of one-party dominance
rather than measures of interparty competition.
A new ipc measure is proposed here, one that is theoretically sound in that
it is addressed to competition in each legislative district, and is capable of
12

For example , Dawson and Robinson, op. cit ., and Dye, op . cit .
V. 0 . Key, Jr., Southern Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1949), especially pp.
288-311 .
14 See, for example , Ranney , op. cit .
13
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identifying the actual patterns of competition in the states . This new measure
has thre~ components the average of which cepcesents a composite ipe-im:lex:
1. one minus the proportion of the popular vote of the victorious gubernatorial candidate;
2. one minus the average vote of all victorious candidates in elections for
the upper house of the state legislature , and;
3. one minus the average vote of all victorious candidates in elections for
the lower house of the state legislature .
The major shift entailed by this new measure is that attention is focused on
the extent of competition in state legislative races regardless of party . This
approach is preferable for technical reasons because it avoids the kind of
problems posed by the Illinois and New York examples. More important is the
fact that this technique is superior in theoretical terms . The Key linkage is
addressed to the degree of party competition in a state political system rather
than the extent of one-party dominance . Perhaps this point was obscured in
subsequent applications of the linkage due to the fact that Key described politics
in the South at a time when one-party dominance and interparty competition
meant essentially the same thing . When applied outside the South in a different
historical period , however, this distinction becomes crucial , both empirically
and theoretically . And we argue that only by focusing on the idea of competition (regardless of party) as described above can we : a) measure the extent of
actual political competition in the states , and b) construct an ipc index amenable
to the framework of contemporary research on comparative state public policy .
Appendix
This new ipc measure can be represented algebraically as follows:
m
s; + 1/ m
h;
i=_l
_____
i=_l
__
n

g
ipc = 1 ______

+

1/ n
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where g = proportion of the vote received by winning gubernatorial candidate
n = number of races for the upper house of the state legislature
s; = proportion of the vote of the winning candidate in the "j th " race
m = number of races for the lower house of the state legislature
h; = propor-tion of the vote of the winning candidate in the '' j th " race

